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Abstract 
With a shortage of debt funding, particularly for real estate investment and 
development, alongside public sector funding cuts, the full effects of which are only 
just being felt, the need to explore alternative modes of regeneration financing has, 
arguably, never been so acute.   When considering the public sector real estate 
asset base, comprising operational assets, commercial estate and development 
land, a series of questions, mostly related to access of finance, are raised.  Such 
questions are often prompted by concerns about refurbishment requirements and 
liabilities, financing of new developments, the creation of sustainable communities 
and the delivery of better estate management. How will these be funded in light of 
current budgetary and wider resource constraints? One option is Local Asset Backed 
Vehicles (LABVs). 
 
LABVs are limited liability special purpose joint ventures, operating through Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) collaboration between a public body and a private 
company.  HM Treasury’s review of sub-national economic development (1) 
emphasized that central government would support the development of LABV’s but 
despite being widely touted by both public and private sectors as a viable way to 
generate additional infrastructure funding, by packaging local authority owned assets 
with private sector equity and expertise, their use in the U.K. remains subdued.  In 
the intervening period there has been little objective evaluation of their merits, 
problems and performance, resulting in myth and rumour filling the gaps. 
 
This article presents findings of a research project that sought to identify essential 
success factors and investigate barriers preventing wider uptake, firstly through a 
comprehensive review of literature on LABVs that have operated in the U.K. over the 
last decade, and secondly, by capturing, through expert interviews, the perceptions 
and experiences of practitioners involved in such LABVs.  The study sheds light on 
some of the myths surrounding LABVs and attempts to dispel some of the common 
misconceptions surrounding their procurement, operation and performance.  The 
research ultimately sought to identify the key measures that are required to make 
LABVs a more viable tool for financing and facilitating investment in economic 
development, regeneration and renewal in the U.K. 
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Introduction 
 
Faced with the need to reduce public sector debt whilst simultaneously seeking to 
expand and improve infrastructure and public facilities, governments increasingly 
regard the private sector as an important source of finance.  In the U.K., successive 
Governments have encouraged public sector organisations to enter into long-term 
contractual partnership agreements with the private sector (commonly known as 
Public Private Partnerships or PPPs), one example of which is Local Asset Backed 
Vehicles (LABVs), which are limited liability special purpose joint ventures, operating 
through PPP (2-3).   
 
By providing long term investment horizons that are attractive to institutional funds, in 
combination with a public/private partnership working ethos, risk sharing and a 
holistic approach, LABVs offer an investment vehicle that can used to fund and 
deliver comprehensive, area based regeneration and renewal of operational assets 
during an era of reduced public sector spending and austerity.  In essence, the 
public sector invests property assets which are matched by a private sector partner; 
the partnership uses the assets as collateral to raise debt finance to develop and 
regenere the portfolio, with the assets reverting back to the public sector if the 
partnership does not proceed as expected (4).  
 
H.M. Treasury’s review of sub-national economic development (1) emphasized that 
central government would support the development of LABV’s, but despite being 
widely touted by both public and private sectors since (2, 5-14), as a viable way to 
generate additional infrastructure funding, by packaging local authority owned assets 
with private sector equity and expertise, their use in the U.K. remains subdued. 
Thompson (15), observes that there has been little objective evaluation of their 
merits, problems and performance, resulting in myth and rumour filling the gaps, a 
deficiency this research seeks to address by investigating the barriers that are 
retarding their utilisation and exploring how such barriers may be overcome. 
 
This article presents findings of a research project that sought to identify essential 
success factors and investigate barriers preventing wider uptake, firstly through a 
comprehensive review of literature on LABVs that have operated in the U.K. over the 
last decade, and secondly, by capturing through expert interviews, the perceptions 
and experiences of practitioners involved in such LABVs.  The study ultimately 
sought to identify the key measures that are required to make LABV a more viable 
tool for financing and facilitating investment in economic development, regeneration 
and renewal in the U.K. 
 
The next section of the article provides a brief summary of the context for the 
emergence of the LABV model, contrasting it with other procurement and asset 
disposal mechanisms such as PFI; this is followed by a comprehensive overview of 
the operation of LABVs in the UK, identification of the barriers preventing or 
hindering progress and examination of possible solutions to overcoming some of the 
problems encountered by PPPs through a series of elite interviews, before 
presenting findings and drawing some conclusions.  
 
 
Context for the introduction of LABVs 
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Perhaps the most notorious and controversial form of PPP is the Private Finance 
Initiative, launched by Norman Lamont, the then Conservative Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, in 1992 and aggressively expanded by New Labour in the latter half of 
the same decade.  It was ostensibly employed as a mechanism to procure private 
sector funding and expertise for the delivery and operation of public goods, at the 
same time as getting capital spending for schools, hospitals, prisons and highways 
off the public sector balance sheet.  PFI’s reputation has become somewhat 
tarnished of late (16-20).  With the credit crunch and its subsequent after effects 
constraining debt based lending for projects, there is an emerging consensus for the 
need to find alternative longer-term funding models to facilitate the provision, 
management and enhancement of real estate assets (9, 21-22); LABVs, along with 
other asset based mechanisms such as Non-Profit Distribution, Growth Bonds, 
Regulated Assets Base models and business rates retention funding mechanisms 
such as Accelerated Development Zones, Tax Increment Financing and the new 
breed of Enterprise Zones, have been identified as a viable mechanism to fund the 
delivery of infrastructure to support areas based regeneration and development (20 
& 22) 
 
Haran et al (9) recommend rollout of LABVs at local authority level, to enable the 
more effective use of assets and bring forward regeneration.  Some consultants who, 
it should be noted, have earned substantial fees from advising clients on LABVs, 
believe that asset backed structures are more relevant today (in austerity era 
conditions) than ever (11-13); providing local authorities with a model that 
simultaneously offers continued control over the direction of the investment, reduced 
exposure to deflated asset values, access to gearing and increased flexibility in the 
vehicle used to deliver infrastructure projects. 
 
‘Public funding cuts and limited debt finance means that for schemes to 
progress, innovations will be needed to deliver regeneration projects 
over the long term. More than ever partnerships and collaboration 
between regeneration agents and investors are needed to move 
projects forward and to reap the benefits of the future a long term 
vision must be sought’. (23) 
 
Thompson (15), similarly regards such long-term vehicles, as ‘pragmatic 
opportunities to deliver outputs and support change in an age of austerity’. 
Conversely, John Laing’s decision to pull out of most of its LABV bids, would suggest 
they are not as confident in the model as others; the main reason cited being a lack 
of traction and scale in UK social infrastructure opportunities (24). Whilst John Laing 
made it clear that the door is not closed to LABVs, their decision sends a clear 
message that LABVs are not a ‘panacea’ for all projects, partners or organisations. 
 
 
Grace and Ludiman (2) regarded LABVs as one of four main methods of asset 
disposal: 
 
1. Land sales - The sale of assets to raise short term capital but potentially 
entails losing control over strategic assets which may impair strategic 
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regeneration initiatives in the future and may not maximise full potential of 
assets; 
2. Development agreements - Similar to land sales in terms of selling land 
however only for single sites and rarely contribute to the sustainable long 
term regeneration of an area; 
3. Private Finance Initiative (PFI) - Highly inflexible and difficult to operate but 
does gain access to private sector funding; the public sector pays the private 
sector partner a fixed fee to manage portfolio of properties; 
4. LABVs - structured to hold and control property assets, thereby leveraging 
private sector equity investment and raising third party debt. In contrast to 
PFI, they are flexible enough to add further projects during the life of the 
partnership and change direction by simple agreement of the parties rather 
than a significant re-writing of the legal documents. 
 
The generic characteristics of each method is summarised in Table 1:  
 
Table 1 Summary of characteristics of Methods of Disposal (Source: 2) 
 
 
LABVs typically operate for around 20 years, after which the assets are returned to 
the investing partners through a pre-determined exit strategy e.g. selling land with 
planning permission, selling land once development is complete, or retaining the 
development as an investment.   Before entering into a partnership, the long term 
goals of the partnership are detailed in the legal documents. These protect the wider 
social and economic aims of the public sector along with the pre-agreed business 
plans based on the requirements of the private sector (7).  One of the challenges of 
researching the performance of LABVs is that the contract documents are 
commercially sensitive and typically confidential to the partners; other limitations of 
study include a paucity of performance data and a lack of transparency and objective 
evaluations of LABVs. 
 
LABV schemes can address some of the weaknesses of other economic 
development vehicles which have been criticised for being overly complex and 
lacking sufficient financial and political resources to deliver growth (10).  LABVs in 
theory appear to be a relativity straightforward finance and investment vehicle 
however the reality is somewhat more complex, a view shared by Pinsent Masons 
who state: 
 
 Flexibility Control Maximise 
Assets 
Value 
Holistic Structured 
delivery 
Land Sale - x x x x 
Development 
Agreement 
x ✓ x x - 
PFI x ✓ x - ✓ 
LABV ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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‘“This is not an area where it is possible to create a ‘one-size fits all’ 
model. Regulatory and structural issues will vary from project to project 
and each structure requires a bespoke approach.’ (12) 
 
Where traditional PPPs, such as PFI, have a specific and clear purpose, for example 
the construction and operation of hospital and educational buildings, LABVs are a 
long-term partnership for the regeneration of a city, town or a cluster of communities, 
which needs to be more flexible as priorities may change over the duration of the 
contract, e.g. due to political changes (15).  Bidgood (20) acknowledges that LABVs 
avoid some of the cumbersome and bureaucratic procurement process and high 
upfront and start-up costs associated with procurement using PFI.  LABVs also offer 
shorter contractual terms, allow the public sector to exploit and unlock the economics 
potential of its estate through regeneration and rationalisation, gain private sector 
efficiency in a less contractualised manner, but are heavily dependent on the 
location of the assets (20).   
 
Pinsent Masons (13) identify three levels of complexity and involvement in LABVs as 
described in the Table 2: 
 
Table 2 Three Levels of Complexity and Involvement (Source: 13) 
Investment  Used where site(s) requires significant investment to make it 
marketable, e.g. where major infrastructure, remediation or 
substantial planning input is required but otherwise the 
opportunity is viable. A private sector investor will fund this 
requirement.  Once the works have been carried out & site value 
is enhanced, the LABV will sell it (or parts of), on the open 
market. Risk adopted is relatively low and profit is fairly modest. 
Value Capture  LABV acts as the developer, ensuring sites are ready for 
development, carries out infrastructure works, obtains planning 
permission and conducts site remediation. This type of LABV 
provides greater scope for profit but risks will be higher. 
Integrated  Deliver most if not all of the required development. The 
construction supply chain is procured before the LABV is 
established. The vehicle potentially carries the greatest risk for 
land assets, planning infrastructure, some or all constructions 
sales but offers the greatest potential for high levels of profit. 
 
There are many LABV models due to the variety of requirements from the different 
parties. Thompson (15) in his insightful report for RICS, highlights the range of 
requirements and recommends that a blend of vehicles could be appropriate. This 
flexibility and ability to adapt may be regarded as one of the main advantages LABVs 
have over traditional investment models.  The following section sets out the key 
characteristics and attributes of LABVs as well as some of the limitations of the 
model. 
 
 
LABV Characteristics and Operation 
 
Most LABVs are 50:50 public/private partnerships with the specific purpose of 
contributing to economic development through the promotion of regeneration and 
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renewal of real estate assets. Typically the public sector invests property assets into 
the vehicle which are then ‘value matched’ by private sector equity. The partnership 
uses the assets as security to raise further finance in order to bring forward further 
investment and development in the assets.  The public and private sector partners 
are equal equity holders and share profits and risk according to their original equity 
contribution.  A basic LABV model is illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: LABV Model (adaptation of 25 & 2) 
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LABVs incentivise the private sector to invest and deliver over the longer term as 
returns are subject to the performance of the partnership over 10-20 years. This 
longer-term investment perspective is seen as an attractive feature of the model, 
emphasised by the Brookings Institution (26) and their recognition of ‘patient capital’ 
being crucial to redevelopment and regeneration in a recession.  
 
Harrison and Marshall (10) argue that LABVs are unlikely to be suitable for every 
Local Authority; for some, a series of legal, technical and financial challenges must 
be overcome in order for the LABV model to deliver local growth. They stress the 
importance of councils considering their options carefully before proceeding with a 
LABV, and rigorously evaluating their land holdings alongside their strategic 
development priorities to assess whether a LABV might help to leverage additional 
investment and in turn support local economic growth (10). 
 
The need to do things differently is compelling and LABVs represent a potential 
alternative to traditional funding and investment models; the main benefits of which 
have been noted, in particular their ability to bring together the public and private 
sectors under an aligned vision and, provide a funding solution for long-term 
regeneration initiative.  Despite these attributes, and broadly positive experience of 
pioneering LABVs (6), the model is under-used and it is appears that wider 
employment of LABVs is hindered by a number of real and perceived barriers.  
Updating survey research conducted by Thompson (16) for the RICS in 2012, Table 
3 characterises twenty LABVs that have been created in the UK since 2002 and 
classifies them into one of four types. 
 
Table 3 LABVs created in England 2002-2014 (Source: 16; 27-33)
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Start 
Date 
                  
         
Duration 
(years) 
Name of 
LABV 
Public sector   
partner 
Private sector 
partner                        
Indicative 
Forecast 
Value 
(£m) 
Type Purpose 
2002 15 ISIS 
Waterside 
Regeneration 
Canal and 
River Trust 
(previously 
British 
Waterways) 
MUSE 
(previously 
AMEC) part of 
Morgan Sindall 
Group; bought 
out 
Aviva/Igloo’s 
50% interest  
50 operational & 
development 
Regeneration of  
5 canal-side 
assets in 
Birmingham, 
Brentford, 
Glasgow, Leeds 
and Manchester  
2004 5-10* North East 
Property 
Partnership 
trading as 
Buildings for 
Business  
Homes & 
Communities 
Agency 
(previously 
ONE North 
East) 
UK Land 
Estates 
155 management Management of 
investment 
portfolio of 1700 
predominantly 
industrial  
properties over 
49 acres; *UK 
Land bought out 
HCA/ONE North 
East interest 
2013 effectively 
terminating JV 
2005 10 Blueprint Homes & 
Communities 
Agency 
(previously 
East Midlands 
Development 
Agency and 
English 
Partnerships) 
Igloo (wholly 
owned 
subsidiary of 
Aviva Investors) 
45 management Management of 
investment 
portfolio and 
regeneration of 
town centre 
sites/business 
parks 
2006 10 Space North 
West Ltd 
trading as 
Norwepp 
Homes & 
Communities 
Agency 
(previously 
North West 
RDA) 
Ashtenne 
Industrial Fund; 
subsequently 
acquired by 
Halsteen 
 
140 management Management of 
wide portfolio of 
assets in 
Merseyside and 
Cumbria. 
Developments 
include Liverpool 
Innovation Park 
and Exchange 
Station  
2007 10 PxP Homes & 
Communities 
Agency 
(previously 
Advantage 
West 
Midlands) 
Langtree and 
Bank of 
Scotland 
64 management Management of 
600,000 sq.ft. 
investment 
portfolio over 130 
acreas; target of 
£100m 
2008 28 Croydon 
Council Urban 
Regeneration 
Vehicle 
(CCURV) 
London 
Borough of 
Croydon 
John Laing 450 town centre 
development 
Four town centre 
sites: Bernard 
Weatherill House; 
Waddon Leisure 
Centre; Taberner 
House; Lion 
Green Car Park; 
key project is 
Public Service 
Delivery Hub for 
Council 
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2008 10* Tunbridge 
Wells 
Regeneration 
Company 
Tunbridge 
Wells 
BC 
John Laing 150 town centre 
development 
Regeneration and 
development 
projects in Royal 
Tonbridge Wells, 
Cranbrook, 
Paddock Wood 
and 
Southborough but 
none delivered; * 
dissolved 2012 
with financial 
settlement for 
John Laing  
2008 10 Solum 
Regeneration 
Network Rail Kier 500 operational Regeneration of 
railway station 
assets; 14 project 
with initial focus 
on 7 locations: 
Christchurch, 
Epsom, 
Walthamstow, 
Redhill, 
Haywards Heath, 
Twickenham & 
Guiford 
2009 15+ SkyPark Devon County  
Council 
St Modwen 210 development Development of 
site at Exeter 
airport for 1.4m 
sq.ft. business 
park 
2009 15 Onsite North 
East 
(previously 
ONEDIN) 
Homes & 
Communities 
Agency 
(previously 
ONE North 
East) 
Langtree Real 
Estate Holdings 
25 development Regeneration of 
23 non-
operational 
development 
sites comprising 
approximately 
1000a  in North 
East 
2010 20 Aylesbury 
Vale 
Estates (AVE) 
LLP 
Aylesbury Vale 
DC 
Guildhouse 3.6 
p.a. 
Town centre 
management 
Management/ 
investment of a 
mixed portfolio of 
non-operational 
assets; 
purchased Hale 
Leys Shopping 
Centre 2012 
2010 20 Sci-Tech 
Daresbury 
(previously 
Daresbury 
Science and 
Innovation 
Campus 
Halton 
Borough 
Council and 
Science and 
Technology 
Facilities 
Council 
Langtree Real 
Estate Holdings 
30 development Development of 
1m sq.ft. of space 
for science and 
technology 
organisations; 
9ha designated 
Enterprise Zone 
status 2011 
2011 20 Bournemouth 
Development 
Company 
Bournemouth 
Borough 
Council 
Morgan Sindall 
Investments Ltd 
350-500 town centre 
development 
Development of 
16 sites, 
principally surface 
car parks, to 
contribute to 
delivery of 
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 Despite the apparent successful creation of up to 20 LABVs in England, our review 
of the relatively limited literature on the operation and performance of LABVs (2, 10-
13, 15-16, 27) has identified the following barriers that are preventing wider use of 
the model in the UK: 
 
a) Procurement and partnership 
b) Low market values 
c) Risk transfer 
d) Economies of scale and critical mass 
e) Lack of skills, knowledge and expertise 
f) Lack of objective evaluation of performance 
 
The following section briefly contemplates each of these barriers in turn, before 
setting out the research methodology that was employed to investigate whether, in 
Council’s Town 
Centre Vision 
 
2011 10 Barton Oxford 
LLP 
Oxford City 
Council 
Grosvenor 
Developments 
Ltd 
40 residential 
development 
Co-investment 
partner to bring 
forward 
development of 
885 units on 38ha 
2011 unknown Scotswood 
Local  
Housing 
Company 
trading as 
New Tyne 
West 
Development 
Company LLP 
Newcastle City 
Council 
Barratt/David 
Wilson Homes 
and  Keepmoat 
Homes 
265 residential 
development 
Establishment of 
a Local Housing 
Company Joint 
Venture to deliver 
1,800 homes on a 
66ha (125a) site 
in west end of 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne; backing 
from HCA 
2011 15 Sheffield 
Housing 
Company 
Sheffield City 
Council 
Keepmoat Ltd 
and Great 
Places Housing 
Group 
unknown residential 
development 
Multi-phase 
delivery of 2300 
new homes on 
60ha of council 
owned brownfield 
land 
2012 15 Slough 
Regeneration 
Vehicle 
Slough 
Borough 
Council 
Morgan Sindall 
Investments Ltd 
1000 town centre 
development 
Phase 1 The 
Curve 
2013 20-25 Kier Kent 
Initiative 
Kent County 
Council 
Kier Group unknown residential 
development 
3 Kent County 
Council owned 
sites in 
Sevenoaks, 
Canterbury and 
Swale to provide 
152 new homes 
2013 
 
unknown Wire 
Regeneration 
Ltd 
Warrington 
Borough 
Council 
Langtree Real 
Estate Holdings 
unknown town centre 
 
development 
Development of 
southern 
(Wilderspool) 
gateway 
2013 20 Evolution 
Gateshead 
Gateshead 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Council 
Home Housing 
Group 
347 residential 
development 
19 council owned 
sites to deliver 
2400 new homes 
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practice, these barriers are surmountable and what needs to be done to overcome 
them. 
 
Barriers hindering wider use of LABVs in the UK 
 
a) Procurement and partnership 
 
A local authority seeking a private sector partner must embark on a competitive 
tender process in line with European Law; if procuring more than just equity 
provision. i.e. procuring goods/works/services, they must then embark on OJEU 
Public Procurement process (8).  The BPF/LGA (6) observed that both developers 
and local authorities are frustrated by the overly prescriptive, complex, prolonged 
and expensive EU procurement processes and that such lengthy and costly 
procedures act as a barrier for developers, making it harder for many local 
authorities to find a suitable private sector investor.  
 
In contrast, Thompson (16) suggests that core principles can be adopted to help 
overcome some of the procurement challenges, starting with the agreeing of a 
strategic direction, establishing a decision-making structure, before identifying 
resources and ensuring that all parts of the organisation are in constant 
communication. Sadly, such an approach is rare in practice, with public and private 
sectors traditionally divided by mistrust and conflicting cultures, goals, motivations 
and objectives (34).  
 
b) Low market values 
 
The credit crunch and consequent restriction of debt financing may have impaired 
the use of LABVs in the U.K., but in many respects the LABV model is perfectly 
suited to the current economic climate, with its potential to increase value by 
introducing high value end-uses to low value sites or using high value assets to 
cross subsidise low value assets (2).  The potential for creating value depends on a 
number of variables such as the nature, quality, location and range of assets put into 
the LABV.  The ability to attract private-sector partners will be easier in areas where 
markets are more buoyant, of which there are few outside Greater London and parts 
of southern of England, leading to some doubt as to the efficacy of the LABV model 
to deliver regeneration in areas that most need assistance (10).  Local Incentive 
Backed Vehicles (LIBVs) have been proposed as alternative model that gets round 
the problem of the public sector transferring their assets at the bottom of a market by 
establishing a development partnership where the private sector partner pays for the 
cost of development in return for an option to purchase the development assets at a 
price that is based on future values (6, 22, 35).  Implicit within both LABV and LIBV 
models is a long term perspective that should offer potential for competitive returns 
to be made over the longer term (23).  
 
c) Risk Transfer 
 
Entering into a long-term partnership offers the public sector a number of benefits, 
such as  access to new markets, increased capacity, risk sharing, access to greater 
resources including staff, private sector expertise and finance, as well as ensuring 
that development strategies are focused and coherent (10).  Despite such benefits, 
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LABV take up in the U.K. has been relatively low (see Table 3). There are a number 
of reasons for this. Local authorities have a responsibility to ensure they get best 
value from the disposal of public assets and are cautious about ‘selling off the family 
silver’ at the wrong time of the property cycle or handing over control of public assets 
(6) 
 
 
d) Economies of scale and critical mass 
 
Whilst the creation of an LABV is complex and requires significant investment of time 
and resources up front, the rewards of doing so may be reaped downstream.  The 
pursuit of the redevelopment of a number of separate sites using a conventional 
procurement model would require hundreds of separate meetings and discussions 
by different parties at different times to gain approval. The LABV model allows 
different sites to be considered as one portfolio, reducing duplication and enhancing 
efficiency by adopting a strategic approach as well as creating opportunities for 
imaginative use of phasing and cross subsidising between different components, 
sites and end-uses. 
 
e) Lack of skills, knowledge and expertise 
 
The lack of skills, expertise and resources in the public sector to effectively procure a 
LABV can act a deterrent to potential private sector partners who regard the need to 
help their public sector partner through an education process of how to be directors 
of a LABV and get their governance in line with the LABV structure as time 
consuming and burdensome.  Conversely, some private sector consultants see this 
as an opportunity to earn fees by providing expertise and knowledge to compensate 
for deficiencies in the public sector. 
 
f) Lack of objective evaluation of performance 
 
LABVs are still in their infancy and with little data available, there is a general lack of 
objective analysis and evaluation of their performance. In its evidence to the APUGD 
(5), RICS suggested that the potential for LABVs to deliver desired outcomes for 
local authorities was, arguably, over-stated when LABVs were first introduced, which 
generated a level of expectation in the market that was unlikely to be delivered (6).  
The need for more transparent, robust information is a recurring theme with LABVs; 
Thompson (15), suggests that the costs and complexity of creating LABVs could be 
mitigated if the public sector share its knowledge, experiences and contract 
documentation more widely. There are clear benefits to sharing of best practice, 
lessons learned and demonstration efficacy and performance of various models 
through comparative study. 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
To answer the questions posed earlier in the paper, a research strategy was adopted 
to gather empirical data and evidence, by way of a comprehensive review of 
literature of LABVs, in order to identify the barriers that are preventing greater use of 
LABVs.  The experience of operating LABVs, their strength and weaknesses, critical 
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success factors and opportunities to overcome barriers were explored by way of in-
depth ’elite’ interviews with seven practitioners, comprising three private practice 
consultants, two public sector, one legal sector and one developer, all of whom have 
intimate experience of advising on, procuring and operating LABVs in the U.K. (for a 
description of and rationale for elite interviewing (36 & 37).  
 
All interviewees were asked the same 14 questions and their responses were 
transcribed in full and analysed using thematic analysis, adopting a three stage 
process as shown in Figure 2, whereby recurring points were identified, coded, 
clustered and synthesised in order to answer the research questions.  Interview 
transcripts were analysed using the constant comparative method which subjects the 
data to rigorous and systematic analysis to derive propositions through inductive 
reasoning (38 & 39) to develop propositions of statements of fact derived inductively 
from rigorous and systematic analysis of interview data and empirical observations 
(40).  King and Horrocks (41) confirm that the fundamental reason for carrying out 
thematic analysis is to deepen understanding and explanation.  A cross case 
analysis was performed by tabulating and comparing the response of interviewees to 
each question to distil responses down into overarching themes which emerge from 
analysis of the interview data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Three stage process of thematic analysis (Source: 41) 
 
The following section presents the seven themes that emerged from the cross case 
analysis, using simple flow diagrams where appropriate to summarise the key 
components of each theme, validated by relevant quotes from the interviewees.  
When quoting the respondents, their anonymity is protected by referring to them by 
letter (A-G) only. 
 
1. Economic Uncertainty  
 
Stage One: descriptive coding 
Read through transcript 
Highlight relevant material and attach brief comments  
Define descriptive codes 
Repeat for each transcript, refining descriptive codes as you progress 
Stage Two: Interpretive coding 
Cluster descriptive codes  
Interpret meaning of clusters, in relation to research 
question and disciplinary position 
Apply interpretative codes to full data set  
Stage Three: Overarching Themes  
Derive Key themes for data set as a whole, by considering interpretative 
themes from theoretical and/or practical stance of project 
Construct diagram to represent relationships between levels of coding in 
the analysis 
Quality checks at 
each stage of the 
process 
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“Well there 
certainly is a 
higher value for 
land in the 
South,” 
There is still a 
North/south 
divide” 
 
Economic Uncertainty 
Will the LABV 
deliver uplift in 
Land Value? 
Council aims 
and 
objectives  
Constraint on 
development 
  
North/south divide 
The biggest barriers 
for us are cost and if 
the LABV will deliver 
the uplift in value in 
the current climate”. 
“there has to be some 
realism about what 
can be delivered, if 
there’s no market” 
“Not many schemes 
in the current 
economic climate are 
viable” 
“We are in a poor 
market at the 
moment, so getting 
any development out 
the ground is 
difficult” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
“ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All respondents agreed that the global financial crisis and resulting economic 
downturn and recession, had acted as a constraint on development and diminished 
what the LABV model could deliver, and acknowledged that public sector 
expectations would need to be tempered accordingly. 
 
“The vision must be realistic and capable of delivering the council’s aims 
and consideration must be taken into account of the current financial 
climate”.  
Interviewee A 
 
Partnership needs to generate good ideas, from both sides, which are realistic in the 
current economic climate; the private sector should not solely be responsible for 
ideas and innovation influencing the direction and performance of LABVs. 
 
One of the perceived barriers to adoption of LABVs is that they require rising land 
values to work, which in most areas requiring regeneration is an unrealistic 
expectation in the current economic climate.  Our findings show this is false and 
inaccurate impression, as interviewee D explained:  
 
“I think probably if you sat on land and did nothing with it, then yes uplift in 
value would not occur; that is why you bring in the experienced private sector 
partner to create that value uplift”. 
 
Interviewee E further elaborated:  
15 
 
 “The council initially needs the help of a private investor to de-risk the 
site by getting planning consent and remediation works etc. and once 
the land is ready for development this would make schemes viable.”   
 
Interviewee D further highlighted the strength of the LABV model by stating: 
 
“It’s effectively creating its own market on the sites. This presents 
options (such as exit strategies) to the council which weren’t available 
before”.  
 
Interviewee D summarises this strength of the LABV with an example: 
 
“There is an LABV being entered into at xxxxxx where the land value is 
zero but you know by putting the sites in at zero and getting a 
developer to help create some site value then the partner can see, ok, 
yes, we can make some money here”. 
 
# insert summary of this section 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Accessing other sources of funding 
  
LABVs can access other funding sources such as revolving loan funding such as 
Growing Places Fund and JESSICA; business rates retention such as Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF), Enterprise Zones (EZs) and Accelerated Development Zones 
(ADZ); and development levies or incentives such as Community Infrastructure Levy 
(CIL) and New Homes Bonus.   The LABV is its own separate entity/company and 
therefore has to bid separately for alternative sources of funding. By doing so, any 
funding gaps which may arise within the LABV could be filled and no state aid rules 
would be breached as the LABV is at arms-length from the council. Interviewee E 
observed that: 
 
 “a combination of these tools does prop up the viability of the 
LABV.......they are an added bonus”.  
 
In conceiving new LABVs, partners should be cognisant of the potential to tap in to 
other sources of funding not available or rationed to Local Authorities.  Interviewee D 
highlighted arrangements in recent LABVs for the profits of both parties to be 
recycled to fill funding gaps for further development.  
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3. Procurement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The time, cost and complexity of procurement was a near universal cause for 
complaint amongst interviewees.  One of the common concerns surrounding 
procurement was that it was a lengthy process which acted as a deterrent to 
investors. Interviewee D confirmed that in the procurement process, the demands of 
OJEU is the biggest barrier to the wider use of the model, discouraging potential 
private sector investors from participating in a complex, costly and demanding 
process when they are not guaranteed success, observing that: 
 
“You get some developers who see there is an OJEU process which 
has to be entered into first and straight away say no, we are not 
bidding for that!” 
 
There are some structures, such as co-investment partnerships, that avoid the 
requirement to follow OJEU process, which demonstrate how quickly LABVs can be 
put in place.  For example, one city council achieved financial closure on its LABV 
within eight months. Where development is being procured, full OJEU process is 
unavoidable, however, as experience and knowledge grows, timescales may be 
reduced from 2-3 years to twelve months.  Interviewee F agreed that the 
procurement process is becoming quicker: 
 
“yyyyyy City Council are going about this process in a speedy manner 
and hope to have full closure and a partner selected within 12 – 18 
months” 
 
Each individual local authority is different and the overall aims and objectives of the 
partnership should determine both the appropriate model to be used which will in 
Procurement 
Time-Consuming Costly Complex Unfavourable 
“The procurement 
process through to 
full financial close 
and start on site 
can potentially 
take up to three 
years.” 
“Hugely time- and 
resource-
consuming”. 
“Requires a 
significant amount 
of money to bid 
for one of these 
things and some 
people just won’t 
do it.” 
 “You have only a 
33% chance of 
winning.” 
“Biggest negative 
is the legal aspects 
of the LABV.” 
“The main 
challenge facing 
the LABV is 
procurement.”  
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turn influence the how the procurement process is conducted and the time taken to 
complete.  
 
The cost to the private sector of bidding for a LABV is also a concern, articulated by 
Interviewee B:   
  
“In current (market) conditions private sector bidders are unable to 
speculate significant sums of expenditure on bid costs and so any new 
LABV model would need to be procured in a more cost and time-
efficient way”. 
 
Shorter procurement timescales should result in reduced costs for both the public 
and private sectors.  
 
Frustration was expressed about the slow speed of public sector decision-making.   
Interviewees C and D acknowledged that whilst local authorities are complex 
organisations, that must conduct their business in a transparent and accountable 
fashion, the competitive dialogue could be improved by a clear focus on the required 
outputs of the process and speedier evaluation of the final shortlist of candidates. 
 
Whilst there was unanimity among the interviewees of the need to review and 
simplify both bidding and funding application processes and legislation, that are 
hampering development deterring investors, there was uncertainty as to how this 
could be achieved, requiring as it does a commitment from the Government to re-
negotiate European legislation and provide some form of exemption from OJEU for 
LABVs. 
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4. Lack of skills, knowledge and expertise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some public sector bodies that might be interested in exploring the potential to 
create an LABV are often hindered by a lack of in-house skills and expertise to do 
so. Ironically, the LABV model may itself offer a potential solution to the problem:  
 
“the public sector (often) don’t have the skills or the funding to take 
regeneration forward by themselves........they need private sector 
input”.  
Interviewee D 
 
The lack of in-house capacity is exacerbated by a dearth of objective commentary 
and best practice with which improve understanding. An initiative to create a central 
knowledge pool of practice and experience of procuring and operating LABVs would 
represent a major contribution to collective intelligence.  
 
 
5. Reluctance of Local authorities to release Assets 
 
LAs may be reluctant, or at the very least ambivalent towards the prospect of 
employing the LABV model to pursue regeneration and economic development.  
Whether this is due to them being risk averse or simply sceptical about the merits of 
a model, about which little is known, is unclear. 
 
Lack of skills and 
expertise  
Lack of objective 
commentary 
Higher level of 
expertise needed 
in public sector 
  
Lack of understanding of 
the LABV model 
“There’s less explicit data 
coming out of LABVs to 
quantify.” 
A lot of it is  on-going and 
still in its infancy.” 
 “Need to increase their 
understanding and level of 
expertise.” 
Public sector lacks the skills 
and expertise in 
development.” 
“However, the public 
sector are lagging behind 
in their understanding of 
LABVs and need to 
increase their level of 
expertise, which is acting 
as a barrier for their wider 
use.” 
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“There was a change in personnel (chief 
executive who wasn’t very fond of the 
idea/fully supportive) which contributed 
towards the LABV being shut down.” 
“It’s having confidence that 6 months into 
the partnership,  if there happens to be an 
election and a (political) change... that the 
new party in power are not going to pull 
it” 
Lack of political support 
Internal Political 
disputes 
Elections and 
Change in 
personnel 
“Does it have the civic leadership 
and political backing to this LABV 
from the public sector?” 
“Does it have strong civic 
leadership; does it have a stable 
political background?” 
“The public sector is (generally) risk-averse and (is concerned) about 
things other than profit and finance, such as job creation & social 
welfare; whereas the private sector is about financial return; there are 
suspicions between both parties”. 
Interviewee F 
 
Interviewee D observed that whilst local authorities often rejected the LABV model 
on the ground that, by giving the private sector full control their assets, they would be 
‘selling off the family silver’, the opposite is in fact the case, as assets are only 
transferred into the vehicle once a business plan has been agreed by both parties 
with the public sector explicitly building in protection of their assets.  
 
Interviewee D explained further,  
 
“Fears about loss (of control) can be allayed as in reality the LABV 
retains a high degree of control for the public sector even in relation to 
assets that are subject to a pre-agreed business plan to which both 
parties must adhere”. 
 
# offer summary of this section  
 
 
6. Competing Priorities  
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With diminishing budgets, local authorities are compelled to re-assess their priorities 
in order to reduce cost whilst maintaining essential services. As a consequence, 
LABVs are often not regarded as a high priority despite the model offering an 
opportunity to release capital whilst safeguarding strategic options in the future. 
 
 “Despite a move towards an increase in public private partnerships, 
many local authorities (have) had to de-prioritise the progression of 
such plans over the short-term to account for more pressing matters”.  
Interviewee F 
 
Interviewee D shared a similar view: 
 
 “Local elections and council restructuring and change in personnel could 
mean changing views for that local authority and this is affecting internal 
continuity and the preparation of long-term programmes (which makes it 
very difficult to consider or justify the implementation of new initiatives 
such as LABVs).”  
 
A lack of political support was also highlighted as an issue: 
 
“The adoption of the LABV requires securing leadership from the 
highest level in the council and clear political support so that a longer-
view of the regeneration and economic development of an area can be 
taken”.  
Interviewee D 
 
It is clear that LABVs may outlive most local government administrations, therefore it 
is essential to secure cross party support. Lessons are being learned and those 
LABVs which have been entered into are showing good progress; the pre-agreed 
terms of one LABV included the signatures of opposition parties which sought to 
overcome any problems presented by a change of administration in the future, a 
problem that has long been a cause for concern for the private sector: 
 
 “Although the public sector is seen as being the key to understanding 
local political dynamics and this is seen as a key output, the LABV 
should be free from political interference such as internal disputes 
between statutory functions, i.e. head of planning and council chief 
executive etc. But when political support is needed then this should be 
available”. 
Interviewee A 
 
Having full political backing and civic leadership were regarded as more important to 
private sector partners than more obvious attributes such as the location of assets. 
 
 
21 
 
7.  Enhancing the take up and performance of LABVs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When interviewees were asked if there was a continuing role for LABVs in delivering 
regeneration in the UK, there was a mixed response:  
 
“It’s one of those things which comes into fashion and people think if 
they’re doing it (then) we should do it, (but) it’s not always appropriate”.  
Interviewee A 
 
“LABVs are certainly not the panacea of all urban regeneration projects 
or anything like that, but for certain types of local authorities/projects it 
does work.”  
Interviewee D 
 
Each local authority must assess their own individual aims and objectives and look 
closely at their asset base before contemplating a LABV; it may not be appropriate, 
in which case they may be better off selling assets or entering into development 
agreements.  What is apparent, is that the LABV structure is flexible and capable of 
adapting, which is an attractive characteristic in uncertain times.  
 
Could LABVs have a brighter future? Interviewee D felt that LABVs offer a simple 
and robust model which may be readily understood, but is hampered by statutory 
and other legislative requirements. If these can be overcome then its use should 
become more widespread as the LABVs that have been entered into on the whole 
have produced positive results.   
 
 “In my opinion, as things stand....  there will only be 3 or 4 (LABVs) 
entered into a year (in the UK).”  
Interviewee C 
 
A lot of the literature 
which I have read is 
more of a sales pitch and 
not objective 
commentary which does 
act as a deterrent.” 
 
Future prospects of LABVs 
Government 
guidance  
More objective 
commentary 
Creation of a 
central 
knowledge pool  
The LABV does need 
an independent 
organisation to get 
their teeth into this 
and push it further”. 
  
“A need to increase 
understanding and 
level of expertise” 
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If measures are taken to tackle some of the barriers identified in this paper, to 
encourage wider take-up of LABVs, then this number could increase. Significantly 
though, the consensus amongst both public and private sector interviewees was that 
the model lacked strong central government backing and support and that without 
clear guidance to dispel some of the uncertainty surrounding the model, this was 
unlikely to occur. 
 
 “one.......thing that would help get the LABV model off the ground is a 
bit more central government guidance and promotion....... to dispel 
some of the rumours and myths about it; (demonstrate that) this is the 
model that works, this is where it has worked; not to give it a seal of 
approval but say,’ look guys you should be looking at these examples’”. 
Interviewee D 
 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
This study revealed that at a time of financial austerity, LABVs offer an alternative 
funding model to enable delivery and kick-start projects. Its key strength over 
traditional methods of disposal is its flexibility; its main weakness is the time and cost 
of procuring a private sector partner, securing cross-party political support and 
managing expectations about what it would deliver.  The main barriers preventing 
wider use of LABVs in the U.K. are lack of objective performance evaluations, skills, 
expertise, Government guidance and advocacy and political buy-in from the public 
sector.  
 
The study has identified the following factors that either deter the creation of LABVs 
or are critical to their success: 
 • close alignment of both parties’ interests • full transparency of costs and benefits  • strong civic leadership and consistent cross-party support • a procurement process that are proportionate and reflects the expected 
benefits especially to the private sector • more effective communication with the market prior to formal procurement 
and ongoing dialogue with bidders throughout the procurement process • flexibility to adopt to future market uncertainties  • experience must be well documented and available for others to access  
 
The research sheds light on some of the myths surrounding LABVs and may help 
dispel some of the common misconceptions surrounding their procurement, 
operation and performance.  In the course of our research we have identified the 
following opportunities to further inform and enhance the prospects for LABVs in the 
U.K.: 
 • a richer evidence base – there is need for more objective and comparative 
performance analysis of LABVs in order to determine what is working, what is 
not, measure outputs and outcomes against aims and objectives and 
establish good practice 
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• explore the potential for combining financial tools alongside LABVs -  
consideration should be given as to how LABVs may be employed in 
combination with other funding sources such as revolving loan funding (e.g. 
Growing Places Fund, JESSICA), business rates retention (e.g. TIF, EZs, 
ADZs) and  development levies or incentives (e.g. CIL, New Homes Bonus) 
 • modelling of the potential impact of targeted Stamp Duty Land Tax 
concession or other tax relief for assets transferred into LABVs 
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